Tópico sobre política

[Samwise]

Por terras americanas...

[Rui Santos]

Movido para offtopic.
Relembro que o offtopic já não tem autodelete :) Por isso é indiferente, e fica classificado mais corretamente.
Deixei link no fórum dvdmania a apontar para aqui.

[Samwise]

Movido para offtopic.
Relembro que o offtopic já não tem autodelete :) Por isso é indiferente, e fica classificado mais corretamente.
Deixei link no fórum dvdmania a apontar para aqui.

Faz sentido. Aliás, a discussão era suposto ter iniciado já em offtopic. Também é bom o tópico não se "ver de fora". É preciso estar registado e logado para o ler, a partir de agora.

Olhando um pouco para o que se passou, é um pouco estranho o Anónimo ter tido uma "performance" tão má a defender as suas ideias. Ao nível de um "capitalista disfaçado", interessado em bater nos sectores radicais da esquerda, e a oferecer então para o abate uma "personagem" grosseira, extremista, e sem realmente ter uma sustentação consistente para propor aos adversários.

A discussão, entretanto, com a sua saída, morreu.

--- moving on ---

Deixo aqui um artigo interessante onde podemos verificar, na prática, os efeitos de uma sociedade socialista ao longo do tempo, quando comparada com uma contrapartida democrática-capitalista que lhe é... gémea. A queda do Muro de Berlim e reunificação da Alemanha, 25 anos depois.

When East and West Germany reunited 25 years ago this weekend, the country was drunk on euphoria and a sense of heightened optimism. While reigning chancellor Helmut Kohl promised “flourishing landscapes”, his predecessor Willy Brandt produced the now legendary sentence: “What belongs together, will grow together”. But how united is Germany a generation on?

The Berlin Institute for Population and Development concluded in a recent study that half of all Germans believe there are more differences between “Ossis” (easterners) and “Wessis” (westerners) than commonalities.

The report, titled How reunification is going – how far a once-divided Germany has grown together again, found there is now little to distinguish life in the east and west in many regards, but there are still huge differences.

The fact that it was possible to bring the two systems together “is a miracle for which it is hard to find a historical equivalent,” said the institute’s director, Reiner Klingholz.

“There is no example of merging two states with such vastly different political systems that has worked so smoothly. But this reunification was, and continues to be, far more difficult to achieve than was thought during the exuberance of the reunification celebrations.

“Even if the two parts were only separated for 41 years – that’s less than two generations – the citizens of east and west were socialised in such a different way that in retrospect the idea that integration would be swift was utopian.”

Klingholz estimates that it will take at least another generation before the two parts have truly grown back together. One major piece of evidence for that, he says, is that “many Wessis have never even been to the east,” while most Ossis have been to the west.

Here is how they compare on key indicators:

Wealth

States in the former west continue to be considerably richer than those in the former east, where ordinary households own far less than half of the wealth accumulated by those in the west.

Of the 500 richest Germans, only 21 are in the east and, of those, 14 are in Berlin. Of the 20 most prosperous cities, only one – Jena – is in the east.

There are many reasons for the differences, including the fact that wages in the east continue to be lower – at €2,800 (£2,075) a month, people earn about two-thirds of the average wage in the west – and that property in the east is only worth half as much in the west.

Another factor is that while Kohl declared wages and pensions should be translated one to one into West Marks in 1990, savings were only translated at a rate of two East Marks to one West Mark. On top of that, as owning property was generally taboo in East Germany, families have less to pass on to their children.

The net wealth of the average westerner is about €153,200 per person. In eastern households it is not even half that. Indeed, east Germans with net assets of at least €110,000 are considered to belong to the richest 10% of adults; in the west, €240,000 is the minimum.

As cars are the most conspicuous indication of a German’s wealth, it is worth noting that a west German is twice as likely to drive a BMW, with an East German twice as likely to drive a Skoda.

Poverty and health

The risk of an east German slipping into poverty is about 25% higher than that of a west German. However, life expectancy has risen considerably in the east since reunification, with women now on a par with their western counterparts. For men, it is slightly lower in the former east.

In terms of health, the concerns are similar, with obesity having increased in the east from between 12%-16% in 1999 to an average of 18% in 2013, and in the west from less than 10%-12% in 1999 to between 14% and 18% in 2013.

Productivity

Productivity in the former east was 70% of that in the west in 1991 and rose to just 73% in 2012, in part a legacy of the number of factories that were bought by west German industrialists and deliberately run into the ground to scotch competition as well as the inefficiency of many companies in the east.

None of the 30 largest companies listed on the German stock market are based in the east. Experts say the fact that most of the large industry and production bases are in the west and that those in the east are far smaller – with most employers in agriculture or service industries like meat-processing and call centres – will have a long-term effect of increasingly holding back the economy in the east and ensuring that the wage discrepancy remains and likely worsens.

Women

In east Germany, more women work (75%) than in the west, (70%), a legacy of a socialist system in which women were encouraged to work and which boasted full employment. In reality, it meant women were pressurised to run a household as well as work full time, a fact that was rarely acknowledged.

As a result, childcare facilities in the east are far superior to those in the west, where every fourth child under three is in a nursery; in the east, it is more than half.

In 1994, polls showed that almost 70% of west German women said children under school age suffered when their mothers worked. Their attitude is now more in line with that of east German women (for whom working and bringing up children has long been the norm), with only 30% of Wessi women now holding that opinion.

East German mothers return to work after childbirth much earlier than their west German counterparts and are more inclined to work full-time. Even part-time working mothers in the east work on average six hours longer than those in the west.

Partnerships

While long-term relationships between Ossis and Wessis were once highly unusual, they now account for about 10% of all partnerships, as likely as a relationship between a German and an immigrant, experts say. Most common is a partnership made up of women from the east and men from the west. Experts have suggested that this is because women prioritise status and wealth when looking for a partner. East-west partnerships are often referred to as “Wossis”.

Voluntary sector

While 37% of west Germans are involved in some sort of voluntary activity – from the fire brigade to church charities – only 30% of east Germans are. Analysts say this is a legacy of the East German state obliging its citizens to carry out supposedly voluntary activities, thereby giving it a negative connotation, and that civil society is still less developed in the former east.
Consumption

Consumer goods were one of the most immediate attractions for east Germans when the Berlin Wall fell, with Levi jeans, Milka chocolate bars and video recorders initially being the most popular goods.

There are few products from the East German era that have made it on to the supermarket shelves of the united Germany. However, Rotkäppchen Sekt, or Red-Riding Hood sparkling wine, Spee washing powder, Radeberger Pilsner and Bautz’ner mustard are among the exceptions and are steadily winning a growing market share among west Germans, with sales increasing in that sector from 34% to 42% between 2007 and 2014.

Preference for particular regional products – from beer to chocolate spreads, cola brands, yoghurts and newspapers – are still often reliable indicators of someone’s origins. Otherwise, consumer habits between east and west Germans are generally similar, even though easterners spend 79% less on consumer goods.

East Germans eat more preserved foods, while west Germans eat more fish and are more likely to fry their food.

Ossis and Wessis spend similar amounts on telecommunications, telephones and television sets. West Germans are likely to spend considerably more on jewellery and watches and are more likely to own a dishwasher, while east Germans tend to spend more on their gardens.

Migration

There are more migrants in west Germany. In the east, migrants make up 4%-9% of the population, while in many parts of the west the figure is about 25%. Despite the large discrepancy, experts say the aversion to migrants in the east is particularly pronounced – largely due to the lack of experience of living with foreigners.

Education

Here the east clearly has the advantage. Comparisons between the 16 German states show that – apart from the southern state of Bavaria – east German states are at the top of the scale.

They perform best in maths, natural sciences, biology, chemistry and physics. Some experts say this is a legacy of the robust education system of the GDR; others believe it is due to having fewer immigrants in east German schools as well as the amount of money that has been invested in the system since 1990.

[JoséMiguel]

Para ilustrar um determinado ponto do artigo que o Samwise citou, acerca da mulher soviética... (no exemplo dele da mulher da R.D.A.) existe mesmo cinema de intervenção sobre esse assunto!

Algo que escrevi e mostrei há seis meses atrás no tópico da animação de leste (eu não ando por lá a falar do Bugs Bunny e Rato Mickey)

É uma pena que já não existam mulheres no fórum DVD Mania... Hoje não as há, mas amanhã poderá havê-las!

Desta feita trago uma animação pela conceituada desenhadora feminista soviética Elena Prorokova, entitulada "C 9 00 do 18 00" das 9 às 18 horas, acerca de uma mulher engenheira civil ou arquitecta que trabalha na câmara municipal de uma cidade russa, nos anos 80.

O que eu achei impressionante é a combinação entre o desenho técnico e a arte. Por exemplo eu domino o AutoCAD profissionalmente, pois já fui projectista, desenhador e orçamentista, mas sou nabo em desenho artístico. Eu fiquei chocado e de boca aberta ao ver esta mulher realizadora soviética meter desenho técnico de precisão e rigor numa animação artística, pois nem estava a ver que seria possível combinar os dois conceitos, mutuamente exclusíveis, do desenho técnico com o desenho artístico.

O que é curioso é que para ela essa questão sem se colocou, pois ela estava mais interessada em mostrar a mulher russa, esposa e mãe, a consolidar a lida de casa com o trabalho de engenharia de planeamento urbano na câmara municipal.

Isto só mesmo no cinema soviético! Animação com maturidade, feita para adultos...

Não se esqueçam de ligar as legendas inglesas no filme do Eus347. Espreitem também os comentários no You Tube, o primeiro foi escrito por mim, que sou nabo e não sei nada sobre animação soviética, e o segundo é a resposta do autor do canal, que realmente é um perito em animação soviética.

[Cabeças]

1º Discurso de António Guterres na ONU como Secretário-Geral eleito:



Vídeo:
http://rr.sapo.pt/video/116458/tenho_fe ... ral_eleito

[JoséMiguel]

Os EUA não são um país democrático...



Os EUA não são um país democrático (Democracia Representativa) como Portugal, Espanha e outros países europeus. O sistema deles é quase idêntico e muito similar à União Soviética pós-Estaline (1953-1991). Esta é a minha opinião que irei fundamentar com recurso ao wikipedia.

Nunca se interrogaram porque em Portugal surgem o PCP, o Bloco de Esquerda, o PEV, o Partido Popular Monárquico, etc. (a lista tem sido enorme, desde o 25 de Abril) e tantos outros "partidos pequenos", no nosso boletim de voto, mas no boletim de voto do povo norte-americano não surgem estes "partidos pequenos"? Afinal existem muitos mais partidos pequenos nos EUA do que em Portugal e Espanha, como por exemplo o partido comunista norte-americano, fundado em 1919. Escolhi este exemplo de propósito, porque salta logo à vista, pois o leitor sabe logo que nunca ouviu nada nas notícias sobre um partido comunista norte-americano, em nenhumas eleições deles.

Eu já irei indicar e citar links do wikipedia que explicam a falta de democracia nos EUA, com as actuais leis totalitárias norte-americanas (típicas de um estado totalitário e opostas a estados democráticos como Portugal e Espanha), que impõem o bi-partidarismo, muito semelhantes às leis da União Soviética, que impunham o mono-partidarismo. Mas quando numa nação, falta e falha o pluralismo de partidos políticos, eu pergunto que diferença existe entre haver um único partido na extinta URSS, ou apenas dois partidos nos EUA, se os restantes partidos são impedidos de aparecerem no boletim de voto? Chamam a esses dois modelos (EUA e URSS) de democracia representativa?

Ballot access laws
Nationally, ballot access laws are the major challenge to third party candidacies. While the Democratic and Republican parties usually easily obtain ballot access in all fifty states in every election, third parties often fail to meet criteria for ballot access, such as registration fees. Or, in many states, they do not meet petition requirements in which a certain number of voters must sign a petition for a third party or independent candidate to gain ballot access.[4] In recent presidential elections, Ross Perot appeared on all 50 state ballots as an independent in 1992 and the candidate of the Reform Party in 1996. (Perot, a multimillionaire, was able to provide significant funds for his campaigns.) Patrick Buchanan appeared on all 50 state ballots in the 2000 election,[5] largely on the basis of Perot's performance as the Reform Party's candidate four years prior.

Fonte: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_par ... ed_States)

Barriers to third party success

Winner-take-all vs. proportional representation
In winner-take-all (or plurality-take-all), the candidate with the largest number of votes wins, even if the margin of victory is extremely narrow or the proportion of votes received is not a majority. Unlike in proportional representation, runners-up do not gain representation in a first-past-the-post system. In the United States, systems of proportional representation are uncommon (Nota: Frase destacada por mim, para ilustrar a inferioridade do sistema americano, perante o sistema português ou espanhol), especially above the local level, and are entirely absent at the national level. In Presidential elections, the majority requirement of the Electoral College, and the Constitutional provision for the House of Representatives to decide the election if no candidate receives a majority, serves as a further disincentive to third party candidacies.

Fonte: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_par ... ed_States)

Sabiam que o povo norte-americano tem inveja do sistema político português? Não me refiro ao nosso país em particular, mas sim ao sistema que nós utilizamos, tal como muitos outros países utilizam. Eu já sabia que grande parte do povo norte-americano sonha com o paraíso que existe em Portugal (concretamente na Europa em geral) no âmbito da tolerância e da não-perseguição religiosa, em que para os desgraçados dos norte-americanos que sofrem perseguição pelos puritanos protestantes, uma sociedade como a nossa é apenas uma Utopia, que ainda não existe. Da mesma forma muitos norte-americanos lutam há muitas décadas para instaurar um sistema político semelhante ao que existe no nosso país.

Em concreto, passo a citar:

The Coalition for Free and Open Elections (COFOE) is a nonpartisan organization in the United States that aims to promote fair ballot access. COFOE was founded in 1985, when representatives from across the political spectrum met in the New York City law office of former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark.

Participants in the early days of COFOE included political independents and members of the Socialist Party USA; the Libertarian Party; the Communist Party; the Citizens Party; the Prohibition Party; and the New Alliance Party. One of the early chairs of COFOE was Socialist David McReynolds, who was succeeded by Ann Rosenhaft and then by Si Gerson of the Communist Party. It has largely been due to the steadfast work of Richard Winger, editor and publisher of Ballot Access News, that COFOE has survived, and grown, as an organization.

COFOE has filed amicus briefs in several court cases relating to ballot access.

In the late 1990s a national ballot access organization with a focus similar to that of COFOE held several meetings in the Washington, DC area, attended by members of the Reform Party, Libertarian Party, Green Party, Natural Law Party, Socialist Party USA, and various independents and others. This new national ballot access coalition discussed the possibility of formally constituting a tax-exempt civic organization for purposes of ballot access litigation and education; at one point some participants in this group considered borrowing the COFOE name.

Fonte: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coalition ... _Elections

Free the Vote North Carolina (founded in June 2008) is a North Carolina-focused Political Action Committee with the primary goal of lobbying for ballot access reform to reduce the burden on political third parties and unaffiliated candidates. The group seeks to educate North Carolinians about ballot access in their state in order to better equip voters with the knowledge on where candidates stand on voting rights. Free the Vote NC also advocates reforming the State's candidate nomination system and Primary Elections.[1]

Free the Vote North Carolina was originally founded as the North Carolinians for Free and Proper Elections, or NCFPE, in June 2008 by Jordon M. Greene, who at the time was a sophomore Political Science major at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte.

Fonte: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_the_ ... h_Carolina

Eu fico muito triste e com pena do desgraçado do povo norte-americano que não tem acesso a eleições livres, sabiam que no wikipedia essa organização "The Coalition for Free and Open Elections", está listada junto com a "The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy" que actualmente trabalha com 25 países africanos, asiáticos, sul-americanos e da europa de leste, onde dialoga com 150 partidos políticos, para tentar promover o multi-partidarismo? Sim os EUA são vistos como um país do terceiro mundo, pelas inúmeras instituições que procuram reformar os sistemas totalitários.



Na imagem acima vemos os países onde a instituição holandesa tenta promover o pluralismo partidário. Os EUA, infelizmente não estão incluídos. Para entenderem melhor a situação nos EUA, espreitem o site da organização americana COFOE: http://www.cofoe.org/

Na minha opinião o sistema de governo dos EUA é semelhante ao Soviete Supremo.

O Soviete Supremo da União Soviética (em russo: Верховный Совет СССР) era a mais alta instância do poder Legislativo da URSS entre 1936 e 1988, sendo a única com poder de passar emendas constitucionais. O líder do Soviete Supremo era o chefe de Estado da União Soviética. [1] a Suprema Corte, além de indicar o Procurador Geral da URSS.

O Soviete Supremo era chefiado por um grupo de deputados eleitos entre os demais, o chamado Presidium, e dividido em duas câmaras eleitas para mandatos de quatro anos:

O Soviete da União: formado por um deputado para cada 300.000 habitantes e mais 791 deputados eleitos por sufrágio universal.
O Soviete das Nacionalidades: composto de um número variável de membros, entre 625 e 750 deputados, representantes das repúblicas federadas, repúblicas autônomas, regiões autônomas e dos distritos nacionais. Eram eleitos 32 deputados para cada uma das repúblicas federais, 11 para cada república autônoma, 5 para cada região autônoma e um deputado para cada distrito nacional.

Ambas as câmaras tinham os mesmos poderes e precisavam de maioria simples para legislar. Eventuais conflitos entre ambas eram resolvidos através de uma Comissão Mista, e caso não houvesse acordo, cabia ao Presidium dissolver o Soviete e convocar novas eleições. [2].

Quando o Soviete Supremo não estava em sessão, suas atribuições eram passadas ao Presidium, que o representava e tinha o dever de informá-lo sobre os atos de governo. Oficialmente, portanto, o chefe do Soviete Supremo era denominado Presidente do Presidium do Soviete Supremo da URSS.

Fonte: https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviete_S ... %C3%A9tica

Qual a diferença entre os EUA e a URSS, a nível democrático? Os políticos soviéticos escolhiam um gajo dentro de um único partido, ao passo que os políticos norte-americanos escolhem 2 gajos um de cada partido (e em seguida atiram esses dois gajos ao circo dos media, para ver quem é o mais popular... que venha o diabo das massas do povo e que escolha entre dois males). A diferença matemática está entre os algarismos um e dois. É difícil encontrar um termo que diferencie um estado totalitário com um partido de um estado totalitário com dois partidos...

Bloqueio dos media norte-americanos e portugueses

Other obstacles facing third parties

The growth of any third political party in the United States faces extremely challenging obstacles, among them restrictive ballot access. Other obstacles often cited[by whom?] as barriers to third-party growth include:

Campaign funding reimbursement for any political party that gets at least 5% of the vote—implemented in many states "to help smaller parties"—typically helps the two biggest parties;
Laws intended to fight corporate donations, with loopholes that require teams of lawyers to navigate the laws;
The role of corporate money in propping up the two established parties;
The allegedly related general reluctance of news organizations to cover minor political party campaigns; (Nota do autor: Destacado por mim)
Moderate voters being divided between the major parties, or registered independent, so that both major primaries are hostile to moderate or independent candidates;
Politically motivated gerrymandering of election districts by those in power, to reduce or eliminate political competition (two-party proponents would argue that the minority party in that district should just nominate a more centrist candidate relative to that district);
Plurality voting scaring voters from credibly considering more than two major parties, as opponents of one would have to unite behind the other to have the most effective chance of winning (see Duverger's law);
The extended history and reputations of the two established parties, with both existing for over 150 years and being entrenched in the minds of the public;
The absence of proportional representation;
The 15% poll requirement by the non-government entity Commission on Presidential Debates;
The public view that third parties have no chance of beating the worse of evils, and are therefore a wasted vote;
Campaign costs of convincing interested voters that the party nominee has a chance of winning, and regaining that trust after an election where the third party got the third-most votes or, worse, split the vote between two similar candidates so that the most disliked candidate won (i.e. "spoiling" the election; this is less of a problem with instant-runoff voting, condorcet voting and range voting).

Fonte: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ballot_access

Eu só soube disto há quatro anos no site de notícias Russia Today, quando vejo um debate presidencial com mais quatro candidatos presidenciais às eleições de 2012 (ganhas belo Barrack Obama), filmada em Chicado, ao qual foi feito blackout pelos media nos EUA e na Europa Ocidental (Portugal incluído), em que os candidatos americanos agradecem ao canal de TV do governo russo, pela oportunidade histórica do povo americano poder ver um debate presidencial completo na TV americana, pela primeira vez na história.

Na descrição oficial do vídeo abaixo conta o seguinte: "Transmitido em direto a 24/10/2012

DEBATE STARTS AT 1:02:55

In response to widespread blackout from both the mainstream media and political establishment alike (nota do autor: destacado por mim), RT is honored to be presenting a platform for the major third-party candidates also vying for the White House this election year to debate. We are offering the event live in cooperation with the debate's organizers, the Free and Equal Elections Foundation.

The event is moderated by multi-award winning broadcast journalist Larry King."



Isto é muito grave e não se trata de nenhuma teoria de conspiração. Existe mesmo blackout dos partidos pequenos pelos media norte-americanos e portugueses (quem diz Portugal, diz a Europa que seja membro militar da NATO). Foi preciso os russos (que não são santos e possuem a sua agenda própria) para dar voz no canal de TV Cabo norte americano "Russia Today USA", para que pela primeira vez na história, o povo americano pudesse assistir a um debate televisivo dos vários candidatos! Isto dá-me vontade de chorar... quando eu era menino nos anos 80, o meu pai estava sempre a ver debates políticos na RTP, que para mim eram a coisa mais aborrecida de sempre, e eu não fazia ideia, que o povo norte-americano na altura, não tinha os mesmos direitos constitucionais do povo português, de poder ver debates na televisão, com todos os candidatos. É preciso aparecerem os russos em 2012, para dar esse direito aos cidadãos norte-americanos? Mas que rábula vem a ser esta!?

Conclusão

Como já salientei numa mensagem anterior, eu até sou politicamente neutro e não me interessa muito o clubismo na política ou no futebol, pois a corrupção e falta de transparência estão fora de controle. Na tal mensagem anterior falei da Democracia Directa, conceito outrora pertencente ao domínio da ficção científica, mas que já tem partidos constituídos pela mundo fora e que está acima de qualquer ideologia ou clubismo político. Eu defendo a Democracia Directa, que é por definição incompatível com qualquer ideologia política, embora quando um dia um qualquer país implementar isso, acho que para votar em qualquer proposta de lei, o povo deva ser obrigado a estudar a proposta, a ouvir as várias opiniões, e de seguida submeter-se a um exame (estilo exame do código) que prove que ele apreendeu todos os detalhes relevantes, caso queira ter o direito de votar em determinada proposta de lei. Porque caso contrário, democracia directa por populismo, dará asas a linchamento popular e a desvio de verbas de hospitais para construir estádios de futebol.

Em relação a esta questão do tópico presente, vejo os EUA como um país política e socialmente atrasado do terceiro mundo, e tenho pena do desgraçado do povo norte-americano, para quem o sistema português (que também tem muita corrupção, falta de transparência e outros problemas) é ainda uma Utopia. Muita gente vai atrás do marketing apresentado pelo cinema de Hollywood, e acha que os EUA é um país "fixe" e "cool" (até é, se forem ricos a viverem num subúrbio da Califórnia), e não consegue diferenciar a propaganda/ficção de cinema e dos noticiários da triste realidade.

Uma pergunta final: Acham bem que a imprensa portuguesa não explique o conceito que apresentei nesta mensagem, em particular quando surgem analistas geo-políticos nos noticiários?

É preciso eu ter sozinho tropeçado no debate da Russia Today e depois ter ido pesquisar, também sozinho, o assunto no wikipedia, para eu ter a noção de como funciona o sistema eleitoral norte-americano?

O que acham disto?

[drakes]

Concordo com as críticas José Miguel, mas relativizo a questão dos americanos de terem criado o bi-partidarismo na prática deve-se ao sistema ser presidencialista, que é inviabilizado quando existem muitos partidos com cadeira no Legislativo tanto da oposição quanto da situação, o que leva a ocorrer algo que é conhecido como "estelionato eleitoral" não se cumpre nada do prometido em campanha, e como a retirada do governante sempre é traumática, diferente do parlamentarismo, em caso de impopularidade tem-se um morto-vivo por quatro anos.

[Samwise]

Ena, não tinha visto ainda esta entrada, José Miguel. Vou ler para depois poder comentar.

[JoséMiguel]

Ena, não tinha visto ainda esta entrada, José Miguel. Vou ler para depois poder comentar.

Força!

Concordo com as críticas José Miguel, mas relativizo a questão dos americanos de terem criado o bi-partidarismo na prática deve-se ao sistema ser presidencialista, que é inviabilizado quando existem muitos partidos com cadeira no Legislativo tanto da oposição quanto da situação, o que leva a ocorrer algo que é conhecido como "estelionato eleitoral" não se cumpre nada do prometido em campanha, e como a retirada do governante sempre é traumática, diferente do parlamentarismo, em caso de impopularidade tem-se um morto-vivo por quatro anos.

Drakes, quero colocar-te uma simples questão, que decerto interessará ao resto do fórum:

A minha análise anterior incluiu uma denúncia contra a imprensa corrupta da União Europeia e dos EUA, que sonegam e fazem "blackout" total aos candidatos políticos norte-americanos, que é um escândalo e foi preciso os russos criarem um canal de notícias norte-americano, para mostrarem um debate com todos os candidatos presidenciais norte-americanos, livre da censura política da UE e dos EUA, para o povo norte-americano ganhar finalmente o direito ao "tempo de antena" que a TV portuguesa dá aos partidos políticos, desde que me lembro (início da década de 1980).

A minha questão para ti, será indicares como esta situação é vista no Brasil, ou na América do Sul em geral... ou seja:

Será que também existe censura política e "blackout" na imprensa oficial sul-americana a tentar sonegar os restantes candidatos presidenciais norte-americanos? Ou se pelo contrário, existem ao menos alguns jornalistas e comentadores geo-políticos no Brasil, que explicam ao povo brasileiro, esses problemas graves do regime norte-americano, bem como o bloqueio pelos media aos restantes candidatos fora do regime totalitário bi-partidário?

Enquanto europeu, fico curioso em saber como os EUA são vistos no Brasil...

[drakes]

A eleição americana é a única que realmente tem cobertura da imprensa brasileira, é normal os grandes veículos de imprensa mesmo com a atual crise terem correspondentes em Washington e New York (muito deles votam) com amplos minutos na tv e espaço nos jornais e revistas. A pauta é feita seguindo o New York Times, e um pouco na parte econômica/geopolítica do The Economist, as diferenças que vc vê deve-se a ideia que podemos aprender algo para aprimorar as nossas eleições já que os EUA são presidencialista e o impacto que tem aos brasileiros que moram lá ( a maior colônia de brasileiros fora da terra de Santa Cruz).

Ideologicamente a imprensa brasileira apoia o partido democrata que é visto como de esquerda, este ano foi escancarado a torcida pela cara de tristeza quando viram que a Hillary perdeu, eu estava assistindo teve até cara de choro.

Sobre o "blackout" é visto como um aprimoramento pela imprensa, o que leva a terem essa ideias é que aqui nas últimas eleições presidenciais foram 11 candidatos assegurado por lei (ou por ação impetrada na justiça) que eles aparecessem nos debates do primeiro turno em sua maioria mesmo os "folclóricos", além disso o Congresso Nacional tem 29 partidos com representantes e uns 50 em atividade, por isso, as regras que forçam o bi-partidarismo nos EUA são ressaltados como vantagem AKA (nas coberturas de televisão).

[Samwise]

Viva José Miguel,

Um primeiro comentário a propósito do teu texto, e em relação à parte em que concordo contigo:

O sistema eleitoral nos EUA está viciado, de forma perpetuar o domínio bipartido do poder, neste caso entre republicanos e democratas. É muito difícil a outros partidos "fazerem-se" ouvir o suficiente a ponto de serem hipóteses credíveis, ou mesmo conhecidas, perante os eleitores. A longa história e tradição destes dois partidos, e o hábito de muitos anos a dividirem o trono, levaram não só a consequências "naturais" que automaticamente dirigem os eleitores para votarem num deles, mas também a escolhas deliberadas, manipulações no aparelho visível e "invisível", no sentido de afastarem quaisquer outras alternativas, como a criação de regras complicadas de cumprir por partidos que não têm fundos nem representantes suficientes.

Neste sentido, há de facto um défice democrático nos Estados Unidos.

Não concordo com praticamente nada do resto, a começar com o título: "Os EUA não são um país democrático". Ser, são, e há muitos mais factores a considerar para podermos fazer uma avaliação mais exacta, mas como em todas as democracias, há vícios e gorduras geradas pelos agentes políticos que se servem do aparelho, e que não se colocam ao serviço dos cidadãos, mas antes ao serviço de si próprios e das clientelas bem-pagantes. E formas de garantirem que continuam no poder.

Mas se reparares, em Portugal também sucede algo semelhante, embora numa escala muito menor: o bipartidarismo domina quase 40 anos da nossa democracia, embora haja outras soluções políticas disponíveis. Nos debates na televisão pública e privada, há sempre uma série de partidos menores que nunca entram, sob o pretexto de não haver tempo para todos, e de essa hipótese retirar espaço útil aos partidos "importantes", que realmente têm hipóteses de ganhar.

Mesmo na solução que temos em vigor neste momento, há um partido que domina e governa. Outros participam na solução, mas são acessórios em quase tudo, e não têm realmente espessura eleitoral para os colocar como alternativas primárias.

Deixo os assuntos em que discordo da tua opinião para outro post.

[Samwise]

Antes de passar ao debate entre URSS (pós 1953) e EUA actuais, um pequeno apontamento:

Sabiam que o povo norte-americano tem inveja do sistema político português? Não me refiro ao nosso país em particular, mas sim ao sistema que nós utilizamos, tal como muitos outros países utilizam. Eu já sabia que grande parte do povo norte-americano sonha com o paraíso que existe em Portugal (concretamente na Europa em geral) no âmbito da tolerância e da não-perseguição religiosa, em que para os desgraçados dos norte-americanos que sofrem perseguição pelos puritanos protestantes, uma sociedade como a nossa é apenas uma Utopia, que ainda não existe. Da mesma forma muitos norte-americanos lutam há muitas décadas para instaurar um sistema político semelhante ao que existe no nosso país.

Creio que não tens fundamentos (nenhuns) para colocar as coisas nestes termos. Podes pensar que isto sucede (no sentido de estares convencido que é assim), mas não podes afirmar que isto é a realidade. A minha noção (e sublinho "noção"), é que a maioria dos americanos não faz a mais pequena ideia de onde fica Portugal, quanto mais do sistema político ou do modelo sócio-económico em prática. E da Europa conhecem de nome alguns países, mas é tudo. Como sucede com qualquer povo que reclama permanentemente melhores condições de vida, a insatisfação e infelicidade levam ao desejo de "mudar o sistema" (=encontrar uma solução que resolva os seus problemas), mas não faz sentido falar em "inveja do sistema político português".

De igual modo, em relação ao "muitos norte-americanos lutam há muitas décadas para instaurar um sistema político semelhante ao que existe no nosso país", estamos a falar de quantos? 10? 100? 10.000.000? O que são "muitos"? Qual é a representatividade desse conjunto no total da população?

[Samwise]

Mas quando numa nação, falta e falha o pluralismo de partidos políticos, eu pergunto que diferença existe entre haver um único partido na extinta URSS, ou apenas dois partidos nos EUA, se os restantes partidos são impedidos de aparecerem no boletim de voto? Chamam a esses dois modelos (EUA e URSS) de democracia representativa?

Na minha opinião o sistema de governo dos EUA é semelhante ao Soviete Supremo.

Qual a diferença entre os EUA e a URSS, a nível democrático? Os políticos soviéticos escolhiam um gajo dentro de um único partido, ao passo que os políticos norte-americanos escolhem 2 gajos um de cada partido (e em seguida atiram esses dois gajos ao circo dos media, para ver quem é o mais popular... que venha o diabo das massas do povo e que escolha entre dois males). A diferença matemática está entre os algarismos um e dois. É difícil encontrar um termo que diferencie um estado totalitário com um partido de um estado totalitário com dois partidos...

A diferença entre os dois sistemas --- a nível de estrutura democrática, isto é --- é absoluta. É quase entre a noite e o dia. Só não é entre a noite e o dia porque a fase pós-Estaline ( 1953 --> ) não é tão escura quanto a anterior, e porque os EUA actuais também não serão propriamente a claridade de um dia sem nuvens ( ).

Mas tu próprio forneces uma parte da argumentação quando referes o segunte: "É difícil encontrar um termo que diferencie um estado totalitário com um partido de um estado totalitário com dois partidos..."

Porque, num estado totalitário (poder absoluto) não há nunca dois partidos. Na URSS pós-Estaline, o clima político e o modelo económico não mudaram nada face ao período anterior. Ou seja, não só os cargos de poder eram estritamente determinados pelas intriga palaciana e pela luta dentro dos estratos altos do partido (eleições populares? quais eleições populares? mudava o chefe, o resto mantinha-se), como a política económica se manteve 100% colectivista, com a industria e as propriedades agrícolas controladas pelo estado, e sem abertura à iniciativa privada. O povo era obrigado a trabalhar segundo aquilo que o estado entendia. O que houve de positivo foi um aligeirar da tirania estatal. Os ciclos de terror massivos contra a população terminaram, os gulags foram desmantelados (milhões de prisioneiros foram amnistiados, embora não lhe tivessem sido dadas condições para regressarem aos seus locais de origem), e a polícia militar, agora designada por KGB, passou a ter outras preocupações em mente --- mantiveram, contudo, o aperto às ideias "contra-revolucionárias", ou seja, quem tentasse "propagandear ideias anti-socialistas" era mandado para a prisão ou obrigado a trabalhos forçados. Na prática, não havia qualquer liberdade de expressão, nem canais não-oficiais para divulgar o que quer que fosse. Este clima foi sendo amenizado aos poucos, porque o resto de mundo, comunidade internacional, começou a conseguir espreitar para o que se passava dentro da URSS, mas só desapareceu por completo em 1991 (face à evolução desde então, já deixou de ser assim novamente)). Numa outra vertente, não havia realmente separação de poderes. Aquilo que o Secretário Geral decretava, se considerasse intervir, era aquilo que os tribunais decidiam. Ainda numa outra vertente, as instituições religiosas continuaram a ser perseguidas e proibidas.

Agora os EUA actuais: os dois partiudos que repartem e alternam o poder são 100% concordante quanto vários aspectos:
- Separação efectiva de poderes (legislativo, executivo, judicial), embora os contextos (democráticos) possam determinar situações de acumulação
- Economia de mercado, totalmente aberta à iniciativa privada. <--- Capitalismo
- Liberdade completa de imprensa
- Liberdade completa de associação
- LIberdade completa de expressão
- LIberdade religiosa completa

A coisa vai ao ponto, como tu próprio referes no teu texto, de permitirem a existência e a acesso a um canal Russo que transmite livremente aquilo que pretende, incluindo debates sobre as eleições americanas que não passam nos canais principais (por influências dos partidos). Imagina alguém na URSS desses tempos (e na Rússia de agora) aparecer em público para fazer uma declaração como a do Robert de Niro que partilhei mais acima, a atacar e a achincalhar um candidato "à chefia"...

---

Para mim a questão da "quantidade" (haver 1 ou 2 partidos) não altera em nada a enormidade de diferenças registada entre as duas situações, ou seja, mesmo que só houvesse 1 partido nos EUA actuais, seria sempre completamente diferente teres um contexto de democracia+capitalismo de um outro com totalitarismo+socialismo. 1 partido num destes contextos não tem nada a ver com 1 partido no outro.

Mas aqui vai uma pergunta. Imagina uma linha de valores de 0 a 10, onde de um lado estão os EUA actuais e do outro a URSS pós 1953. Imaginando que os valores correspondem à tua preferência enquanto país/sistema para viver, com o zero a significar que não terias dúvida em escolher os EUA e com o dez a significar que não terias dúvida em escolher a USSR (o cinco seria "tanto faz"), que número escolherias?

[Samwise]

Só para complementar, e para quem se interessar por estas coisas, partilho um trecho retirado do The Black Book of Communism, centrado no início da era pós-Estaline.

Less than two weeks after Stalin's death, the gulag system was completely reorganized and brought under the authority of the Ministry of Justice. Its economic infrastructure was immediately transferred to the relevant industrial ministries. Even more spectacular than these administrative changes, which demonstrated clearly that the Ministry of Internal Affairs was losing its place as the most powerful ministry, was the announcement, in Pravda on 28 March 1953, of a large amnesty. By virtue of a decree promulgated by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. the previous day and signed by its president, Voroshilov, the following were granted amnesty:

Anyone sentenced to less than five years.

Anyone sentenced for lying, economic crimes, and abuses of power Pregnant women and mothers with children under age ten, minors, men over fifty-five, and women over fifty.

In addition, the amnesty provided for the halving of all other sentences except those handed out for counterrevolutionary activities, grand theft, banditry, and premeditated murder.

In a few weeks about 1.2 million prisoners—nearly half the population of the camps and penal colonies—were released from the gulags. Many of them were small-time criminals sentenced for petty theft; still more were simple citizens who had been convicted under one of the innumerable repressive laws that governed every sphere of activity, from "leaving the workplace" to "breaking the law regarding internal passports." This partial amnesty, which notably excluded political prisoners and special deportees, reflected in its very ambiguity the still ill-defined changes that were afoot. The spring of 1953, a time of tortuous reasoning, was also a time of intense power struggles when even Lavrenti Beria, the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of internal affairs, seemed to be turning into a great reformer.

What considerations dictated such a large amnesty? According to Amy Knight, the biographer of Beria, the amnesty of 27 March 1953, which was adopted at the behest of the minister of internal affairs himself, was part of a series of political measures indicating a new, liberal direction in the thinking of Beria, who, like the others, was involved in the power struggle after Stalin's death and was thus also caught up in the spiral of rising political stakes. To justify the amnesty, Beria had sent a note to the Presidium of the Central Committee on 24 March in which he explained that of the 2,526,402 prisoners in the gulags, only 221,435 were "particularly dangerous criminals," and that most of those were kept in special camps. In an astonishing admission, he noted that an overwhelming share of prisoners posed no threat to the state. A large amnesty was therefore desirable to free up a penal system that was both overcrowded and intrinsically unwieldy.

The issue of the increasing difficulty of managing the gulags was regularly raised in the early 1950s. The crisis in the camps, which was widely acknowledged before Stalin's death, puts the amnesty of 27 March in a new light. Economic as well as political reasons induced the potential successors of Stalin to proclaim a large but partial amnesty. They were aware that the gulags were overcrowded and totally inefficient.

Here, as elsewhere, no radical measures could be taken so long as Stalin was still alive. As the historian Moshe Lewin once noted so aptly, everything was "mummified" in the last years of the dictatorship.

Even after Stalin's death, of course, not everything was possible. The principal victims of the system's arbitrary nature—the political prisoners condemned for counterrevolutionary activities—failed to benefit from the amnesty. The exclusion of political prisoners from the amnesty sparked a number of riots and revolts among prisoners in the special gulag camps and in the Rechlag and Steplag.

On 4 April it was announced in Pravda that the conspirators of the Doctors' Plot had themselves been the victims of a miscarriage of justice, and that their confessions had been extracted "by illegitimate means of interrogation," which everyone understood to mean torture. The importance of this acknowledgment was amplified further by a resolution adopted by the Central Committee a few days later on legal violations by the state security forces." It emerged clearly that the Doctors' Plot had not been an isolated incident, and that for some years the security forces had been abusing their powers and had been involved in illegal activities. The Party claimed that it was now rejecting these methods and clamping down on the excessive powers of the police. The hope engendered by these statements immediately elicited an enormous response, and the courts were swamped by hundreds of thousands of demands for rehabilitation. Prisoners, particularly those in the special camps, were exasperated by the limited and selective nature of the amnesty of 27 March. They were well aware of the turmoil among the guards and the systemwide crisis, and they simply turned on the guards and commanders, refusing to work or to obey orders. On 14 May 1953 more than 14,000 prisoners from different sections of the Norilsk penitentiary organized a strike and formed committees composed of delegates elected from various national groups, in which Ukrainians and people from the Baltic states played key roles. The main demands of the prisoners were a reduction of the working day to nine hours, the elimination of labels on their clothes, an end to restrictions on communication with their families, the removal of all informers, and an extension of the amnesty to include political prisoners.

The official announcement on 10 July 1953 of the arrest of Beria, who was accused of being an English spy and an avowed enemy of the people, confirmed the prisoners' impression that something had indeed changed in Moscow and made them even more forceful in their demands. The strike became increasingly widespread; on 14 July more than 12,000 prisoners from the Vorkuta prison complex also went on strike. One sure sign that things had changed was that the authorities began to negotiate with the prisoners, repeatedly postponing an attack.

Unrest was endemic in the special camps from the summer of 1953 until the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956. The largest and most sustained revolt broke out in May 1954, in the third section of the Steplag prison complex in Kengir, near Karaganda in Kazakhstan. It went on for forty days and was put down only after special troops from the Internal Affairs Ministry had surrounded the camp with tanks. About 400 prisoners were arrested and resentenced, and the six surviving members of the commission that had led the resistance were executed.

Another sign that things had genuinely changed with the death of Stalin was the fact that some of the demands made by the striking prisoners in 1953 and 1954 were actually met; the working day was indeed reduced to nine hours, and other significant improvements in the quality of life for prisoners were introduced.

In 1954-55 the government took a series of measures that significantly altered the enormous power of the state security forces, which had been totally reorganized in the aftermath of Beria's arrest. The troiki —the special courts that judged all cases handled by the secret police—were abolished altogether. The secret police were reorganized into an autonomous entity, renamed the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security, or KGB), purged of one-fifth of all personnel who had worked there before Stalin's death, and placed under the authority of General Ivan Serov, whose achievements included oversight of the deportation of various ethnic groups during the war. An associate of Nikita Khrushchev, Serov embodied many of the ambiguities of a transitional period in which previous leaders were still in positions of authority. The government decreed more partial amnesties, the most important of which, in September 1955, freed everyone who had been sentenced in 1945 for "collaborating with the enemy," as well as the remaining German prisoners of war. Finally, several measures benefited the "specially displaced," who were henceforth allowed to move around more freely, and no longer required to register quite so regularly at the local komandatury. Following high-level German-Soviet negotiations, German deportees, who represented 40 percent of those held in special colonies (more than 1,000,000 out of approximately 2,750,000), were the first to benefit in September 1955 from the easing of restrictions. However, the wording of the new laws made it clear that the lifting of judicial restrictions and the changes in professional status and residency requirements would not lead to "the return of confiscated goods or a right to return to the place from which the 'specially displaced' had originated.

These restrictions were a significant part of the partial and gradual process that came to be known as de-Stalinization. Carried out under the direction of a Stalinist, Nikita Khrushchev (who, like all the other leaders of his generation, had played a major role in the worst acts of repression, such as dekulakization, purges, deportations, and executions), de-Stalinization could afford to condemn only certain excesses of the "cult of personality." In his "Secret Speech" to the Soviet delegates at the Twentieth Party Congress on 24 February 1956, Khrushchev was extremely selective in his condemnation of Stalinism and did not call into question any of the major decisions taken by the Party since 1917. This selectivity was also apparent in the chronology of the Stalinist "deviation " Because this deviation supposedly began in 1934, it excluded the crimes of collectivization and the famine of 1932-33. The selectivity was also apparent in the choice of victims, who were all Communists and had generally followed the Stalinist line; they were never ordinary citizens. By restricting the list of victims of oppression to Communists who had suffered at Stalin's hand, and by focusing solely on historical episodes that happened after the assassination of Kirov, the Secret Speech evaded the central question of the collective responsibility of the Party toward society since 1917.

The Secret Speech was followed by a series of concrete measures to complete the limited steps that had already been taken. In March and April 1956 decrees were issued in regard to "specially displaced" persons from ethnic groups that had been punished for supposedly collaborating with Nazi Germany and deported in 1943-1945. These people, according to the decrees, were "no longer to be subject to administrative surveillance by the Internal Affairs Ministry." There was, however, no restoration of their confiscated goods, nor were they allowed to return home. These half-measures were met with considerable anger; many deportees refused to sign statements requiring them to abandon all claims for compensation, the restoration of their goods, and the right to return home. Faced with a remarkable shift in the political climate and the popular mood, the Soviet government made new concessions. On 9 January 1957 the government once again recognized the republics and autonomous regions of the deported peoples, which had been abolished in the immediate aftermath of the war. Only the autonomous republic of the Tatars in the Crimea was not reinstated.

For more than three decades the Crimean Tatars struggled for their right to return home. From 1957 on, the Karachai, Kalmyks, Balkars, Chechens, and Ingush slowly began to return by the tens of thousands. Nothing was made easy for them by the authorities. Numerous disputes broke out between deportees trying to move back into their former homes and the Russian colonists who had been brought there from neighboring regions in 1945. Having no proptski licenses from the local police granting the right to live in a given place—the returning deportees were again forced to live in shantytowns, encampments, and other temporary housing, under the permanent threat of arrest for failing to comply with passport laws (an offense that brought two years' imprisonment). In July 1958 the Chechen capital, Grozny, was the scene of bloody confrontations between Russians and Chechens. An uneasy peace was established only after the authorities freed up funds to build accommodations for the former deportees.

Officially, the category of "specially displaced' existed until January I960. The last deportees to be freed from this pariah status were Ukrainians and people from the Baltic states. Faced with the prospect of more administrative obstacles to their return, more than half of the Ukrainians and Baltic peoples settled in the places to which they had been deported.

In 1954—55 90,000 "counterrevolutionaries" were released from the gulags; in 1956-57, after the Twentieth Congress, nearly 310,000 were freed. On 1 January 1959 only 11,000 political prisoners remained in the camps.'' To expedite the release of prisoners, more than 200 special review commissions were sent into the camps, and several amnesties were decreed. Liberation, however, was not synonymous with rehabilitation. In 1956 and 1957 fewer than 60,000 people received any sort of pardon. The vast majority had to wait for years, and sometimes decades, before obtaining a certificate of rehabilitation. Nevertheless, the year 1956 remained engraved in popular memory as the year of the return, admirably described by Vasily Grossman in his novel All Things Pass. This great return, which took place in almost total silence as far as official pronouncements were concerned, together with the realization that for millions no return would ever be possible, threw many people into deep confusion and began a vast social and moral trauma, a tragic confrontation in a divided society. As Lidia Chukovskaya wrote, "two Russias looked each other in the eye: the one who had imprisoned, and the one who had been imprisoned." Faced with such a situation, the initial response of the authorities was not to accede to the demands of any individual or group regarding the prosecution of officials who had broken socialist law or used any illegal methods of investigation during the "cult of personality.” The only means of appeal were the Party control commissions. The political authorities sent instructions to the courts regarding pardons, making it clear that the first priorities were Party members and soldiers. There were no purges.
After the release of political prisoners, the post-Stalin gulags saw the number of inmates dwindle, before stabilizing in the late 1950s and early 1960s at around 900,000 prisoners: a core of 300,000 common criminals and repeat offenders serving long sentences and 600,000 petty criminals who had been sentenced in accordance with laws requiring prison terms quite out of proportion to the offense committed. The pioneering role played by the gulags in colonization and in exploitation of the natural and mineral wealth of the far north and east began to fade, and the huge Stalinist prisons were slowly broken up into smaller units. The geography of the gulags changed, too. Most camps were again established in the European part of the U.S.S.R. Confinement in the post-Stalin era took on the more conventional purpose that it has in other societies, although it retained features that distinguished it from the normal legal system. Various groups were sporadically added to the common criminals in accordance with whatever crackdown was in force at the time—on alcoholism, vandalism, "parasitism"—and a few (several hundred each year) were sentenced under Articles 70 and 190 of the new penal code, adopted in 1960.

These commutations and amnesties were completed by some major changes in penal legislation. Among the first reforms was the law of 25 April 1956, which abolished the 1940 law forbidding workers to leave the workplace. This first step in the decriminalization of the labor laws was followed by several other partial measures, which were systematized with the adoption of new "Foundations of Penal Law 11 on 25 December 1958. The new laws did away with several key terms from earlier penal codes, including "enemy of the people" and "counterrevolutionary crimes." The age of legal responsibility was raised from fourteen to sixteen; the use of violence and torture to extract confessions was outlawed; people accused of crimes were to be present at all stages of the inquiry and were entitled to a lawyer who was aware of the details of the case; and, with few exceptions, all trials were to be public. The penal code of 1960 did, however, retain several articles allowing for the punishment of any form of political or ideological deviancy. Under Article 70, anyone a caught spreading anti-Soviet propaganda ... in the form of mendacious assertions denigrating the state" could be given a sentence of six months to seven years in the camps, followed by exile for two to five years. Article 190 required a sentence of three years in the camps or in community-service work for any failure to denounce anti-Soviet behavior. During the 1960s and 1970s these two articles were widely used to punish political or ideological "deviancy." Ninety percent of the several hundred people sentenced each year for u anti-Sovietism" were found guilty under these two articles.

During the political thaw, when the quality of life was clearly rising although memories of the oppression remained strong, active forms of debate or dissent remained rare. KGB reports noted 1,300 "opponents" in 1961, 2,500 in 1962, 4,500 in 1964, and 1,300 in 1965. 7 In the 1960s and 1970s three categories of citizens were the object of particularly close surveillance by the KGB: religious minorities (such as Catholics, Baptists, members of the Pentecostal Church, and Seventh-Day Adventists); national minorities who had been hardest hit by the Stalinist repressions (notably people from the Baltic states, Tatars from the Crimea, ethnic Germans, and Ukrainians from western Ukraine, where anti-Soviet resistance had been particularly strong); and the creative intelligentsia belonging to the dissident movement that grew up in the 1960s."

After a last anticlerical campaign, launched in 1957, which limited itself to closing several churches that had reopened since the war, the confrontation between the Orthodox Church and the state subsided into uneasy cohabitation. The attention of the KGB's special services was directed more toward religious minorities, who were often suspected of receiving assistance and support from abroad. A few numbers demonstrate that this was indeed a marginal concern: from 1973 to 1975, 116 Baptists were arrested; in 1984, 200 Baptists were either in prison or serving a sentence in a camp, and the average sentence was only one year.

In western Ukraine, one of the regions most resistant to Sovietization, a dozen or so nationalist groups in the OUN tradition were broken up in Tcrnopil, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Lviv between 1961 and 1973. Sentences passed on the members of these groups generally amounted to five to ten years in prison. In Lithuania, another region that had been brutally brought to heel in the 1940s, local sources reveal that there were comparatively few arrests in the 1960s and 1970s. The murder of three Catholic priests under suspicious circumstances in 1981, in which it was almost certain that the KGB was involved, was, however, felt to be an act of intolerable provocation.

Until the breakup of the U.S.S.R., the Crimean Tatars, who had been deported in 1944 and whose autonomous republic was never reinstated, remained a burdensome legacy of the Stalinist era. At the end of the 1950s the Crimean Tatars, most of whom had been settled in Central Asia, began a campaign (yet another sign that times really had changed) petitioning for their collective rehabilitation and for authorization to return to their homeland. In 1966 a petition of 130,000 signatures was delivered by a Tatar delegation to the Twenty-third Party Congress. In September 1967 a decree from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet annulled the charge of "collective treason." Three months later a new decree authorized the Tatars to settle in a location of their choice, provided they respected the passport laws, which required a legal document to work in any given place. Between 1967 and 1978 fewer than 15,000 people—about 2 percent of the Tatar population—managed to comply with the passport law and return home. The Crimean Tatar movement was assisted by General Petro Grigorenko, who was arrested in May 1967 and sent to a psychiatric hospital, a form of imprisonment used for several dozen people each year in the 1970s.

[No Angel]

Como é que as coisas mudaram positivamente após Estaline, se foi após a morte dele que começaram a internar em hospicios qualquer um que fosse contra a ideologia comunista?! Passou-se dos Gulags pra hospicios onde te davam choques eléctricos e te drogavam a força.